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I. INTRODUCTION
Free speech-its legality, constitutionality, and necessity have often been
the subject of heated arguments. Among the debates that surround this subject,
few are as intense as the debate that rages over the media's First Amendment
right of access to the courtroom. The "cameras in the courtroom" debate first
arose in 1950,1 when the Supreme Court decided Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia.' The doctrine was later solidified in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Supe-
rior Court,3 and its application must now be considered in a new context-the
seemingly infamous4 and often-debated military tribunal.'
J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. Special thanks to my parents, James and Roxanne Zarrella, for their continued love
and support and Charles Tomasch for giving me perspective. Thanks also to Brenda Hamil-
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I Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("One of the demands of a democratic society is that the public
should know what goes on in courts by being told by the press what happens there, to the
end that the public may judge whether our system of criminal justice is fair and right.").
2 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) ("[A] presumption
of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.").
3 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 11), 478 U.S. 1 (1986). The
Press-Enterprise H test allows proceedings to be closed to the public, if a strict scrutiny test
is satisfied. Id. at 13-14. The concern of the test is to assure fairness to the parties involved.
Id. at 7. The first part of the test is to determine whether there is a "historical right of access
to the proceedings." Id. at 9. Next, the Court balances the interests advanced by closure with
the interests advanced by allowing the media and general public to attend the trial. Id. at 8.
If the proceeding is one that passes both tests, then a qualified right of access attaches and
only interests of closure that satisfy the strict scrutiny test will be permitted. Id. at 9-10.
4 See William Safire, Seizing Dictatorial Power, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 2001, at A31
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There are many unresolved issues involving the press's and the public's
right of access to military tribunals, including: What access, if any, do report-
ers have to these proceedings? As most persons prosecuted under these pro-
ceedings are non-citizens, does the First Amendment even apply, or should it?
Does the government really expect the American people to allow these so-
called "secret courts" to exist and to try persons accused of crimes? Why do
we not treat non-citizen enemy combatants in a time of war just as we treat
criminal defendants in peacetime and simply allow them a public trial by jury
like ordinary citizens?
This Comment will first summarize the law regarding military tribunals and
the media's First Amendment access to criminal proceedings conducted before
such tribunals. It will then examine the traditional tests military courts use for
allowing media access to the courtroom in courts-martial and civilian judicial
proceedings. This section will also examine the similarities and differences
between these proceedings and the modem military tribunal. Third, this Com-
ment will discuss, in the context of war, the presumption of full access that
federal and state courts offer to the media and public in regular criminal pro-
ceedings. This presumption is not merely unworkable when applied to the trial
of non-citizen enemy combatants, but it also potentially damaging to the inter-
ests of national security and to the safety of others directly involved in the pro-
ceedings, such as the judges and jurors. Ultimately, it will conclude that a mili-
tary tribunal is so unlike a modem criminal trial that restricting First Amend-
ment access to both the press and the public is justified.
This Comment does not focus on the legality of the establishment of mili-
tary tribunals and will take no position on whether proceedings by a military
tribunal are a legitimate tool of justice. Rather, this Comment seeks only to
answer one question: "Does the media enjoy a First Amendment right of ac-
cess to military tribunals?"6
(calling military tribunals "kangaroo court[s] [that] can conceal evidence by citing national
security, make up [their] own rules, [and] find a defendant guilty even if a third of the offi-
cers disagree.").
5 See ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363 (C.A.A.F. 1997) ("Every case that involves
limiting access to the public must be decided on its own merits. Furthermore, the scope of
the closure . . .must be 'reasoned,' and not 'reflexive."' (quoting San Antonio Express-
News v. Morrow, 44 M.J. 706, 710 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996)); see also United States v.
Scott, 48 M.J. 663 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (detailing a limited right of access to courts-
martial proceedings).
6 For the purposes of this Comment "military tribunal" will be defined under Proce-
dures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. pt. 9 (2004) [hereinafter DOD Order]. This directive was is-
sued in accordance with instructions and permission of the President of the United States.
See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. § 918 (2002) [hereinafter Military Order].
This definition will be the only one discussed here, as discussion of alternate proposals and
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II. THE AUTHORITY TO CONVENE MILITARY TRIBUNALS
A. Constitutional Authorization
The United States exists today in a state of undeclared war of self-defense.
Two United Nations resolutions endorse the United States' right to pursue
known terrorists in response to the attacks against the United States on Sep-
tember 11, 2001. As a result of this state of war, President George W. Bush's
administration has determined that non-citizen enemy combatants must be
tried, not in regular criminal courts, but before military tribunals. Pursuant to
Article I1, Section II of the Constitution, the President is Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces On November 13, 2001, President Bush invoked his
authority as Commander in Chief and authorized the use of military tribunals
to try non-citizen enemy combatants. 9
Additionally, the legislative and judicial branches have sanctioned the use of
such military tribunals at one point or another. The Constitution vests in Con-
gress the power to "provide for the common defense [sic] ... [and] define and
punish . . . [o]ffenses against the Law of Nations."" On September 18, 2001,
Congress enacted a joint resolution that permitted the President to use "all nec-
essary and appropriate force" against terrorists, their sponsors, and those who
protect them.' Further, the Supreme Court has determined that under the Con-
stitution there is authority sanctioning the use of military tribunals. 2 These
three sources of presidential, 3 congressional, " and judicial approval, coupled
forums would detract from the true focus of the Comment. The question this Comment
seeks to answer is whether the First Amendment guarantees the media and the public a right
to access military commissions and does not attempt to focus on the legality of military
tribunals, an equally important topic, though one this Comment shall not discuss.
7 See S.C. Res. 1368, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
9 See Military Order, supra note 6, at 918.
10 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 10.
11 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. 12001)).
12 See Exparte Vallandigham, 86 U.S. 243 (1864); Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942);
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
13 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military
Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 249, 252 -(2002) (noting that President Bush cited four sources
of authority for the Order: the commander in chief power; Congress's September 14 Joint
Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force; 10 U.S.C. § 821; and 10 U.S.C. § 836 and con-
cluded that "[t]hese sources provide sufficient authority for the President to establish mili-
tary commissions.").
"4 The Joint Resolution passed on September 14, 2001 authorizes the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
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with the United Nations recognition of a right of self-defense, provide ample
protection and precedent for the President's decision to use military tribunals
to try non-citizen enemy combatants.
Ex parte Quirin6 provides a detailed history of the use of military tribunals
in the United States and demonstrates that, in this country, trying non-citizen
enemy combatants and those who contravene the law of nations has occurred
in many instances. 7 In this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the use of
curred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such na-
tions, organizations or persons.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (Supp. 12001).
The Joint Resolution characterizes the attacks as "armed attacks" against the United
States in order to justify the use of force in self-defense. Indeed, the Joint Resolution
arguably characterizes the attacks as inherently unlawful acts of war, or "war crimes."
Thus, the language of the Joint Resolution clearly contemplates executive action aimed
at attacking and killing those responsible for the September 11 attacks, or capturing,
detaining, and punishing any such persons. In this sense, it is clear that Congress con-
templated the direct, severe application of U.S. power against a foe formally character-
ized as the enemy.
See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is The President Bound By The Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 129-130 (2004).
15 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28 (holding that both the Commander in Chief Clause of
the Constitution and Congress both allow the President to convene military tribunals).
16 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
17 Id. at 31 n. 10 (demonstrating that in the "Mexican War military commissions were
created in [] large number[s] . . . [and d]uring the Civil War military commissions were
extensively used for the trial of offenses against the law of war.").
As a practical matter, it seems that military tribunals were used, despite the questions
as to their constitutionality. Their use was again questioned before the Supreme Court
during World War I1 in the case of Ex Parte Quirin.
In Quirin, a group of Nazi saboteurs attempted to sneak into the United States for the
purpose of destroying U.S. infrastructure. They were captured almost immediately and
tried by military tribunal. Defense lawyers argued that the accused spies were entitled
to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, as well as the other constitutional pro-
tections contained in the Bill of Rights. The attorney for the spies, relying on Milligan,
argued that the Constitution applied even during war.
By the time the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, there was a great deal of po-
litical pressure to uphold the convictions. The Quirin decision upheld the use of a mili-
tary tribunal as used under the specific circumstances of that case, because the accused
spies were "unlawful belligerents." Nevertheless, many experts argue that it does not
provide blanket authorization for the use of military tribunals. Scholar Michael
Belknap wrote that Justice Stone thought it was a "dubious decision." Justice Douglas
also regretted the ruling. "It is extremely undesirable to announce a decision on the
merits without an opinion accompanying it," he said, referring to the fact that the Court
entered a brief order upholding the tribunals shortly after the arguments, but did not is-
sue a full opinion until many months later. Justice Stone, in writing the opinion, admit-
ted that "a majority of the full Court are not agreed on the appropriate grounds for the
decision." The Court also recognized that some offenses cannot be tried by a military
tribunal because they are not recognized by our courts as violations of the law of war or
because they are in the class of offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury.
[Vol. 14
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military tribunals is constitutional and stated:
[A]n enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the pur-
pose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents
who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be of-
fenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.' 8
Later, in In re Yamashita, the Supreme Court concluded that a military
commander has the right to seize and subject to discipline enemy combatants
that have violated the law of war.'9 The Court reasoned that "[t]he trial and
punishment of enemy combatants.. . is ... not only part of the conduct of war
[that operates] as a preventative measure against such violations, but is... [a]
sanction without qualification . . . so long as a state of war exists-from its
declaration until peace is proclaimed."2
B. Judicial Authority and Case Law
The history of judicial review of military tribunals is lengthy2' and dates
back to 1863 when the Supreme Court concluded under the Judiciary Act of
1789 that it has no authority to review the outcome of a justly-commissioned
military tribunal.22 The Court revisited the issue in Ex parte Quirin. There, the
Court further articulated the principle that military tribunals were not "courts"
as contemplated by the Judiciary Act and concluded that neither the Fifth
Amendment right to a grand jury nor the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by a
Although the Quirin decision appears to authorize military tribunals for "unlawful bel-
ligerents," the court failed to articulate specific criteria that must be present in order for
a military tribunal to be valid. The Court stated, "[w]e have no occasion now to define
with meticulous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to
try persons according to the law of war. It is enough that petitioners here . . . were
plainly within those boundaries .. "
Reporter's Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Secret Justice: Access to Terrorism Proceed-
ings (2002), http://www.rcfp.org/secretjustice/terrorism/tribunals.html (alterations in origi-
nal).
18 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
19 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1946).
20 Id.
21 Seva Johnson, Military Tribunals and the War on Terrorism: An Interview With
Frank Moran, 66 Soc. EDUC. 96, Mar. 2002, at 96. Since most of the relevant case law per-
taining to the history of military tribunals focuses on the legality of the use of the military
tribunal and not the First Amendment right of access, this paper will only include a small
discussion of such prior case law of the legality of tribunals, and will instead focus on the
First Amendment issues that surround them.
22 See Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 251-52 (1863) ("[A] military commission
[is not] a court within the meaning of the 14th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. [T]he
court cannot, without disregarding its frequent decisions and interpretation of the Constitu-
tion in respect to its judicial power ... review or pronounce any opinion upon the proceed-
ings of a military commission.").
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jury of one's peers attached to proceedings before a military commission."
The Ex parte Quirin Court upheld the use of a military tribunal to try Ger-
man spies, but only after it first determined that they qualified as "unlawful
combatants."24 In justifying the use of the military tribunal, the Court under-
took a lengthy discussion about the historical pedigree of such commissions by
noting that as far back as the Mexican and Civil Wars, military tribunals were
used extensively to try law of war violations. 5
The Court has readily recognized the overriding importance of presidential
discretion in military matters, especially in times of emergency:26
No doubt there are cases where the expert on the spot may be called upon to justify his
conduct later in court, notwithstanding the fact that he had sole command at the time and
acted to the best of his knowledge. That is the position of the captain of a ship. But even in
that case great weight is given to his determination and the matter is to be judged on the
facts as they appeared then and not merely in the light of the event. When it comes to a de-
cision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of indi-
27
viduals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment.
Historically, federal courts do not review military proceedings. 8 When such
proceedings have been reviewed, it was only at the behest of civilians who
were making the claim that "Congress had no constitutional power to subject
them to the [military system of justice]."29 The Supreme Court chose to review
only civilian cases, reasoning that "disruption caused to Petitioner's civilian
lives and the accompanying deprivation of liberty made is 'especially unfair to
require exhaustion' [through proper military channels] ... .
Throughout the years, there has been recognition of the inherent difference
between the proceedings of military and civilian courts." The two tribunals are
23 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39 ("Presentment by a grand jury and trial by jury ...
were procedures unknown to military tribunals, which are not courts in the sense of the Ju-
diciary Article, and which in the natural course of events are usually called upon to function
under conditions precluding resort to such procedures." (citation omitted)).
24 Unlawful combatant is defined as [one] who secretly and without uniform passes
the military line of the belligerent in a time of war, seeking to gather military informa-
tion and communicate it to the enemy, or [one who enters] for the purpose of waging
war by the destruction of life or property. [Such people are] generally deemed not to be
entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war and
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.
Id. at 30-31.
25 Id.
26 See generally The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1863) (allowing for wide use of presidential discretion in determining if the United States
was at war).
27 Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909) (quoting Lawrence v. Mintum, 58 U.S.
100, 110 (1854)).
28 See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758-59 (1975).
29 Id.
30 Id. (quoting Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 696 n.8 (1969)).
31 See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United
[Vol. 14
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replete with differences in both purpose and effect, and in the rights afforded to
defendants under each system.32 In recognition of their differences, courts have
explicitly held that courts-martial do not have to provide the same constitu-
tional safeguards as Article Ill courts.33 The differences in jurisdictional reach
between Article Ill courts, military tribunals, and courts-martial, though argua-
bly substantial, do not exclude any of the fora from guaranteeing justice to
those tried. The scope of jurisdiction of courts-martial are very limited because
the forum has jurisdiction solely over defendants who are members of the
armed forces.34
Over time, the Supreme Court began to extend its faith in the military sys-
tem of justice and broadened the scope of what constitutes the appropriate
reach of a military commander's authority in a time of war. The In re Yama-
shita Court also recognized a new class of persons subject to military tribunals:
the "enemy combatant."36 In 1975, in Schlesinger v. Councilman, the Supreme
Court once again pronounced its faith in military courts.37 The Schlesinger
States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) ("A civilian trial ... is held in an atmosphere conducive to the
protections of individual rights, while a military trial is marked by the age-old manifest
destiny of retributive justice.").
32 See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
33 See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 261.
The Constitution ... recognizes that the exigencies of military discipline require the
existence of a special system of military courts in which not all of the specific proce-
dural protections deemed essential in Art. IlI trials need apply .... The result has been
the establishment and development of a system of military justice with fundamental
differences from the practices in the civilian courts.
Id. at 261-62. Though the "service related test" set forth in O'Callahan was struck down by
the Court in Solorio, the Court still found jurisdiction was appropriate, as did the Court in
O'Callahan. Both Courts did however disagree as to the test for finding jurisdiction, there-
fore, the O'Callahan Court's findings that recognize the important differences between the
military and civilian systems ofjustice is still good law. Id.
31 Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439 ("The test for jurisdiction ... is one of status, namely,
whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person who can be regarded as
falling within the term 'land and naval Forces."').
35 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, I 1-12 (1946).
[A military commander must not only adopt measures] to repel and defeat the enemy,
but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who, in their attempt to
thwart or impede our military effort, have violated the law of war .... The trial and
punishment of enemy combatants ... is ... not only a part of the conduct of war [that]
operat[es] as a preventative measure against such violations, but is... [a sanction] ...
without qualification .. .so long as a state of war exists-from declaration until its
peace is proclaimed.
Id.
36 Id. at 11. In re Yamashita also justifies not only the detention of persons aiding the
war effort but also their prosecution after capture, so as to prevent them from rejoining the
fight. Id.
37 See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 760 (1975) ("[The military system of
justice is] a system carefully designed to protect not only military interests, but [a defen-
dant's] legitimate interests as well.").
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Court stated unequivocally that "deference . . . should be accorded [to] the
judgments of the carefully designed military system [of justice]. . ."" and rea-
soned that "it must be assumed that the military court system will vindicate
servicemen's constitutional rights."39
C. Presidential Authority: The Military Order of November 13, 2001
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush released a Military Or-
der entitled "Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism" ("Military Order"), wherein certain procedures and
provisions for trying non-civilians by military commission were outlined. ° The
Military Order laid out the reasons for the creation of the policy4' and provided
a basic framework of parameters to be followed. Implementation of the Order
was left to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense.
The Military Order specifically identifies who is to be tried under this Or-
der"2 but expressly exempts American citizens from prosecution."3 The Military
Order also identifies offenses that are triable by military tribunals: "violations
of the laws of war and other applicable laws," as well as "any and all offenses
triable by military commission.""5 Of the rights provided to defendants subject
to the Military Order, some clearly differ from those afforded to a criminal
defendant in a proceeding conducted by Article III courts; 46 others are not pre-
sent at all. 4 The right to counsel 4 and the right to a full and fair trial49 however,
are specifically guaranteed. The Military Order also gives the tribunal exclu-
sive jurisdiction over individuals subject to its dictates and expressly prohibits
individuals from seeking review in any state or federal court or international
38 Id. at 753.
39 Id. at 758.
40 Military Order, supra note 6, at 918.
41 Id.
42 Persons subject to the Order include but are not limited to "those who are or were
members of Al Qaida [and those who] engaged in, aided, abetted, or conspired to commit,
acts of international terrorism" or those who harbor such individuals. Id.43 Id. at 919.
44 Id. at918.
45 Id. at 919.
46 See Human Rights Watch, A Comparison Between the Proposed U.S. Military Com-
mission and U.S. General Courts-Martial, (Dec. 17, 2001),
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/miltribchartl2l7.htm. Unlike Article III courts, unanim-
ity in conviction and sentencing is not required. Military Order, supra note 6, at 920. A con-
viction or sentence can be secured by a two-thirds majority. Id. There is no set standard of
proof. Id. at 921. There is no right of appeal. Id.
47 The Military Order is also silent on the presumption of innocence and on the provi-
sion of Brady material. Military Order, supra note 6.
48 Id. at 920.
49 Id.
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tribunal,"
D. The Defense Department Responds: Military Commission Order, No. I
On March 21, 2002, The Department of Defense ("DOD") issued Military
Commission Order No. I ("DOD Order"), a detailed enumeration of proce-
dures for the trial of individuals subject to the Military Order." The DOD Or-
der provides a detailed breakdown of the provisions that govern military com-
missions12 and reserves, along with the Military Order, the exclusive right to
promulgate procedures that will govern such tribunals. 3
The DOD Order provides a myriad of protections for the accused. Among
these protections is the requirement that any attorney, including a civilian
one,54 represent a client with zealous advocacy.5 Moreover, to ensure the integ-
rity of the proceedings, the DOD Order includes penalties for lawyers who
breach the rules of the Commission. 6 The section dealing with protections for
the accused contains sixteen subsections mirroring the traditional rights af-
forded to the accused in a regular criminal proceeding57 and includes the right
to a public trial. 8 The Order also provides many different ways to protect wit-
ness testimony and other information, such as allowing the witness to testify by
phone or other audiovisual means. 9 Thus, although the Military Order does not
explicitly guarantee many of the freedoms of a federal criminal trial as gener-
ally understood by Americans, the DOD Order goes to great lengths to balance
liberty with security and ensures a fair process to the accused.
Section 9.6(b) of the DOD Order outlines the duties of the commission dur-
ing the trial: providing a full and fair proceeding along with proceeding impar-
50 Id. at 921.
5t DOD Order, supra note 6.
52 See, e.g., id. § 9.4(a)(2) (number of members that will sit on the commission); id. §
9.4(a)(3) (All members will be members of the armed forces); id § 9.4(a)(4) (Presiding
Officer will be a Judge Advocate General Corps of the Armed Forces Officer); id. §
9.4(a)(5)(i) (Presiding Officer will have the authority to close proceedings).
53 Id. § 9.1.
54 Id. § 9.4(c)(2)(iii)(B).
11 Id. § 9.4(c)(2)(i).
56 Id. § 9.4(a)(5)(ii) (holding that a lawyer may be excluded from appearing before the
commission if they engage in misconduct).
57 Id. § 9.5. The accused has the right to see a copy of the charges in his native lan-
guage, be presumed innocent, be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, have council pre-
sent with the right to cross examine and present witnesses and evidence, be appraised of all
exculpatory evidence in possession of the prosecution, not to incriminate himself, to a full
and fair trial, to be present at every stage of the proceedings, to not be subject to double
jeopardy and for the trial to be open to the public. Id.
58 Id. § 9.5(o).
59 Id. § 9.6(d)(2)(iv).
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tially and expeditiously.6" The DOD Order explicitly states that "[p]roceedings
should be open to the maximum extent practicable[]'6 and can be closed upon
the Presiding Officer's own initiative or by the ex parte request of council,
provided that the appropriate conditions for the closure are present. 2
Section 9.6(d)(5) of the DOD Order directly affects the First Amendment
right of access and addresses issues such as protective orders, limited disclo-
sures, closure of proceedings, and protection of on the record information.63
Under the DOD Order, the Presiding Officer can issue a protective order to
safeguard classified information, which includes any information that would
endanger the physical safety of any proceeding participant, names of wit-
nesses, intelligence sources, methods, activities, or "other national security
interests."' Concerns that arise regarding information contained in a document
can be addressed in several ways: the document may be redacted, a summary
of the classified information may be provided, or a "statement of relevant facts
that the [classified] information would tend to prove may" be provided to
counsel.65 Finally, the DOD Order authorizes the Presiding Officer to order
evidence containing classified information to be sealed and to limit review of
that evidence to only "reviewing authorities in closed proceedings."66
III. HISTORIC FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
A. Civilian Courts
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether the First Amendment guarantees the press and the public
alike-the right to access a criminal trial.67 The Court concluded that criminal
proceedings carry a "presumption of openness,"68 reasoning that the right of
access to a criminal trial was indispensable and necessary to preserve the free-
doms historically guaranteed to all Americans.69 Furthermore, "the First
60 Id. § 9.6(b)(1)-(2).
61 Id. § 9.6(b)(3) (emphasis added).
62 Id. § 9.6(d)(5)(i)(A)-(D).
63 Id. § 9.6(d)(5)(i)-(iv).
64 Id. § 9.6(a)(5)(i)(E).
65 Id. § 9.6(d)(5)(ii)(C).
66 Id. § 9.6(a)(5)(iv).
67 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) ("We hold that the
right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment ....").
68 Id. at 573 ("[A] presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial
under our system of justice.").
69 Id. at 580 ("[W]ithout the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised
for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be eviscer-
ated."' (quoting Brazburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972))).
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Amendment guarantees of speech and of the press standing alone prohibit gov-
ernment from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to
the public ....
Two years later in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, the Supreme
Court further defined the press's and public's right to access criminal proceed-
ings.7 The Globe Newspaper Co. Court struck down a Massachusetts manda-
tory closure rule pertaining to victims of sexual assault and upheld Richmond
Newspapers Inc. 's contention that the press and general public have a constitu-
tional right of access to criminal trials.7 ' The Court stated that "a major purpose
of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."" The Court then undertook an historical analysis which harkened back
to the practice of English courts and referred to the presumption of openness as
"organic. 7 4 It further emphasized a "tradition of accessibility" in the American
system of justice and the importance placed upon such openness by our forefa-
thers.75 The need for public scrutiny of the judicial process was another argu-
ment advanced by the Court in favor of openness: "public access to the crimi-
nal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect
for the judicial process."76
Despite the seemingly endless endorsement of public criminal trials, the
Court did not sustain the right as absolute,77 but instead crafted the right as a
presumption that could be overcome." Indeed, the Court would allow closed
proceedings that contained "sensitive information" if the state could prove the
interest advanced could pass a strict scrutiny test.79 Nevertheless, a footnote in
the decision made it clear that "time, place, and manner restrictions""° would
70 Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
71 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
72 Id. at 603.
73 Id. at 604.
74 Id at 605.
75 Id.
76 ld. at 606.
[T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the func-
tioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole. Public scrutiny of a
criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding [sic]
process, with benefits to both the defendant and to the society as a whole.
Id.
77 Id. ("Although the right of access to criminal trials is of constitutional stature, it is not
absolute.").
78 Id. at 607 (holding that the state must show a "[C]ompelling governmental interest, ..
[that] is narrowly tailored to serve that interest" if they wish to restrict access to a proceed-
ing).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 607 n.17 (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18
(1976)).
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not have to pass a strict scrutiny test.81
The Globe Newspaper Co. Court objected to Massachusetts' mandatory clo-
sure statute because it was overly broad.82 The State's reasoning was rejected
because there was no empirical evidence that such restrictions would protect
victims of sex crimes from embarrassment or encourage others similarly situ-
ated to come forward. 3 The Court found that such blanket closure, as the stat-
ute permitted, precluded the ability of the presiding judge to make individual
findings and to decide each trial on a case-by-case basis, which was clearly the
preferred method that the Court had earlier delineated.84
Finally in 1986, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court ("Press-
Enterprise i/'),85 the Court articulated a definitive two-part test for media ac-
cess to the courtroom.86 The first part of the test, known as the "experience
test," presumes that there is a First Amendment right of access to criminal pro-
ceedings. 7 It can be summarized as follows: proceedings cannot be closed
unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that "closure is
essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that inter-
est."88 The common theme of the test, both to the accused and to the public, is
the "assurance[] of fairness."89 When a defendant objects to closure, "the hear-
ing must be open unless the party seeking closure advances an overriding in-
terest that is likely to be prejudiced."9 Under the test, a trial court must first
determine whether there is a presumptive or historical right of access to the
proceedings.' The Supreme Court invoked historic English law and held such
a right existed.92
81 Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581-82 n.18
(1980)).
82 Id. at 610-11 (holding that a mandatory blanket closure rule is "unconstitutional.").
83 Id. at 610 (noting that the State of Massachusetts "offered no empirical evidence that
blanket closure would encourage minor victims to come forward with their stories, nor
could the state prove that such closure would foster cooperation between the victims and the
state).
84 See id. at 609 n.20.
85 Press-Enterprise I1, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
86 Id. at 8-9 (holding that some government processes, such as grand jury proceedings
must be conducted in secret and "[it] takes little imagination to recognize that there are
some kinds of government operations that would be totally frustrated in conducted
openly.").
87 Id.
88 Id. at 9-10.
89 Id. at 7.
90 Id. at 9.
91 Id. at 8. The experience and logic test "consider[s] whether the place and process
have historically been open to the press and general public." Id.
92 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) ("[W]ithout the
freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects
of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated." (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes,
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The second part of the broader test is known as the "logic test."93 This test
asks "whether openness would play a positive role in the functioning of the
process.. ." or if there "is a pertinent interest that requires closure."94 Here, the
trial court balances the interest being advanced by restricting access with the
right of the press to broadcast the proceedings or the public to be informed of
them as they are happening.95 If there is a historical right of access and access
is deemed logical, then the proceeding is one that passes both prongs of the
test, creating a presumptive, but not absolute, First Amendment right of ac-
cess.96 Once the presumptive right of openness attaches, proceedings will only
be closed if narrowly tailored interests are served.97
The Press-Enterprise II Court also concluded that in addition to the actual
trial proceedings, there is a presumptive First Amendment right of access to
preliminary hearings.98 Such right of access, the Court reasoned, will provide
"community therapeutic value,"99 give the public "confidence that standards of
fairness are being observed,"'00 allow deviations from standard practice to be-
come known,' and instill "confidence in the system."'' 2 Since the presumptive
"First Amendment right of access attaches to [all such] proceedings[, they]
cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrat-
ing that 'closure is essential to preserve higher values0 3 and is narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest."'0 "
B. Military Courts
Military courts address issues relating to First Amendment rights of access
408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
93 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9.
94 REPORTER'S COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 17.
95 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9.
96 Id. at 9.
97 Id. ("[The] presumption [of openness] may be overcome only by an overriding inter-
est based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest.").
98 Id. at 10.
99 Id. at 13 (determining that since violent crimes often "provoke public concern, out-
rage and hostility" the public is provided a healthy outlet when they know that the law is
being enforced).
'oo Id. (holding that the mere allowance of public viewing will be able to assure those
unable to attend the trial that established procedures are being followed).
'o' Id.
12 Id. (finding that openness enhances both the fairness of the trial as a whole and it is
that appearance of fairness that is so integral to the functioning of our justice system).
103 Id. at 13-14, (holding that one such "higher value" could be the defendant's right to a
fair trial (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984))).
104 Id.
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in a similar manner. In United States v. Grunden,"' the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals held that the right to a public trial is required during courts-martial
proceedings,' 6 but the court also recognized that the right is not absolute."0 7 In
addition, the court's opinion construes the public right of access more narrowly
than does the Supreme Court."8 Although the Grunden court noted that excep-
tional circumstances could result in closure, it still required that such instances
be held sparing in order to ensure that the "emphasis [is] always toward a pub-
lic trial."' 9
Despite adhering to the presumption of openness, the Grunden court ob-
served that if classified information might be disclosed "all spectators may be
excluded from an entire trial, over the accused's objection . . . .""' Though the
court did not approve the blanket exclusion of spectators under the specific
facts of Grunden, the court did observe that a compelling showing could ap-
prove such a practice if shown that "such was necessary to prevent the disclo-
sure of classified information.'""
Although it adhered to the balancing test outlined in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. and Press-Enterprise II, the Grunden court acknowledged the uniqueness
of the military society."2 In developing its right of access test, known as the
"Grunden Test," the Grunden court stressed the importance of this uniqueness
by highlighting the need to protect national security information." 3 The Grun-
105 United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (C.M.A. 1977). Though Grunden deals with a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, the decision provides the most ade-
quate test available that addresses concerns of access. The facts in Grunden are similar to a
military tribunal situation and therefore an interesting analogy can be made with First
Amendment rights. Though the First Amendment right of access is not mentioned in this
case, the same concerns and considerations surround the application of both amendments
and therefore lends itself to an apt analogy.
106 Id. at 121.
107 Id. at 120.
108 See id. Here the court lists specific persons that courts have "long held" have been
able to attend such proceedings and includes friends, relatives the accused's attorney. The
list does not include the press or general public (citing United States v. Brown, 7 C.M.A.
251, 256 (C.M.A. 1956)).
109 See id. at 120-21. Here the court explicitly recognizes that the preservation of classi-
fied information and national security secrets is an acceptable reason for closure. It further
gives explicit textual authority in its decision regarding this matter.
110 Id. at 121.
M11 Id.
112 Id. at 121-22 (because of such differences this case proposed a different test when
classified information or matters of national security may be involved. The court held that
the judge's "initial task is to determine whether the perceived need urged as grounds for
exclusion of the public is of sufficient magnitude so as to outweigh 'the danger of a miscar-
riage of justice which may attend judicial proceedings carried out in even partial secrecy."'
(quoting Stamicarbon, N.V. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 539 (2d Cir. 1974)).
113 Id. at 122 ("[S]pecial deference should be accorded matters of national security."
(quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.1973)); see also id. at 122 (If a judge
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den Test requires a military judge to conduct a closed preliminary hearing dur-
ing which the prosecution details what material is classified, where they antici-
pate such material to be involved in the case,"4 and the scope of the exclusion
of the public."5 The proper balance between secrecy and exclusion is struck
only when the exclusion of the public is circumscribed to the portions of the
testimony that contain classified information." 6
In ABC, Inc. v. Powell"7 and United States v. Scott,"8 two U.S. military
courts of appeals recognized a limited First Amendment right of access. In
Powell, the court concluded that "[e]very case that involves limiting access to
the public must be decided on its own merits . . . [and] the scope of closure
must be tailored to achieve the stated purposes and should also be 'reasoned'
[and] not 'reflexive.""' 9 The court was unequivocal: "Today we make it clear
that, absent 'cause shown that outweighs the value of openness,' the military
accused is likewise entitled to a public Article 322' investigative hearing.'
2
Blanket closures that dispense with specific on the record findings will
rarely survive a First Amendment challenge. In United States v. Scott, the court
found that a trial judge abused his discretion when he ordered an entire factual
stipulation sealed without first making specific factual findings on the record
as to his reasoning. 22 Quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc., Press-Enterprise,
finds that the inclusion of certain evidence would expose matters of concern to national
security, he is free to exclude the public from their revelation).
"4 Id. at 122. This pre-trial hearing should be held on a case-by-case basis and will de-
termine the differing levels of closure and restriction required. In this hearing, the govern-
ment "must demonstrate that it has met the heavy burden of justifying the imposition of
restraints on this constitutional right." Id. The court held that "[the party seeking closure]
can do so by demonstrating the classified nature of the materials in question." Id.
"15 See id. at 123. The Court held that is it necessary for the judge to analyze not only
which witnesses' testimony will involve classified material but also what specific portions
of their testimony will involve such material.
116 Id. ("This bifurcated presentation of a given witness' testimony is the most satisfac-
tory resolution of the competing needs for secrecy by the government, and for a public trial
by the accused.").
"17 47 M.J. 363 (C.A.A.F. 1997); See also RICHARD L. CYs & ANDREW M. MAR, DAVIS
WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, MEDIA ACCESS TO THE NEW SPECIAL TRIBUNALS: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM HISTORY AND THE MILITARY COURTS (2002),
http://www.dwt.com/related links/adv bulletins/CMITWinter2002.htm#b 1.
I's 48 M.J. 663 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998); see also CYs, supra note 117.
119 Powell, 47 M.J. at 365 (quoting San Antonio Express-News v. Morrow, 44 M.J. 706,
710 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996)).
120 See generally Uniform Military Code of Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 832 et seq. (2000); see
also id. § 832(a) ("[The purpose of an Article 32 investigation is to] inquir[e] as to the truth
of the matter set forth in the charges, consideration of the form of charges, and a recommen-
dation as to the disposition which should be made of the case in the interest of justice and
discipline.").
121 Powell, 47 M.J. at 365 (quoting Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509
(1984)).
122 Scott, 48 M.J. at 667.
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and Grunden, the Scott court clearly described its rationale for an open hear-
ing:'
23
It is clear that the general public has a qualified constitutional right under the First
Amendment to access to criminal trials . . . [and] this access applies with equal validity to
trials by court-martial. The Manual for Courts-Martial generally provides that "courts-
martial shall be open to the public" . . . [and] [o]pening courts-martial to public scrutiny
"reduces the chance of arbitrary or capricious decisions and enhances public confidence in
the court-martial process.1
24
Closure would only be considered appropriate if the presiding judge felt
there was an "overriding interest" justifying closure. 25 The Powell court articu-
lated a four-part balancing test:
(1) the party seeking closure must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be preju-
diced; (2) the closure must be narrowly tailored to protect that interest; (3) the trial court
must consider reasonable alternatives to closure; and, (4) [the trial court] must make ade-
quate findings supporting the closure to aid in review. 1
26
In United States v. Scott, the court added the additional requirement of ex-
plicit on the record findings to justify disclosure. This requirement added extra
protection to the process and ensured aid in defense of the decision should an
appeal ensue. After reviewing the facts, the Scott court concluded that the trial
court's closure did not survive for several reasons. First, the trial judge sealed
the entire stipulation when none of the parties so requested. 27 Second, the
judge failed to make factual findings on the record to justify his closure, and
therefore, it could not be said that such an order was narrowly tailored to serve
the interests of the party seeking closure.'28
IV. MILITARY TRIBUNALS VERSUS CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Why Right of Access Must Differ
There are several reasons why traditional First Amendment right of access
should not be extended to military tribunals. First, the Supreme Court has his-
torically manifested approval of the military system of justice.'29 There is no
evidence that any military court would endanger the rights of those it tried.
Second, unlike military servicemen or prisoners of war who are protected by
123 Id.
124 Id. at 665.
125 Id. at 666 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984)).
126 Id. (brackets in original).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 666-67.
129 See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 759 (1975); see also Robert H. Bork,
Having Their Day in (a Military) Court: How Best to Prosecute Terrorists, NAT'L REV.,
Dec. 17, 2001, at 18, 18.
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the Geneva Convention, non-citizen enemy combatants do not abide by the
rules of war and do not merit such protections. 3 Third, American citizens will
not be under the jurisdiction of military tribunals. Instead, only non-citizen
enemy combatants who do not enjoy the same rights as citizens may be sub-
jected to a tribunal's jurisdiction. 3' Fourth, the DOD Order, the implementing
document for military tribunals, does not allow for blanket closure without
appropriate findings.'32 All previous court decisions mandate this appropriate
balance. Fifth, terrorists (and other non-citizen enemy combatants) are capable
of higher levels of destruction than average criminals and are so dissimilar to
them that the process under which the government brings them to justice must
recognize this and provide the public with extra security.'33 Sixth, there are
many indications in the DOD Order that the government intends tribunals to be
open proceedings to the fullest extent possible.'34 The public and press should
therefore be more willing to afford them the parsed secrecy they so desire in-
stead of demanding tribunals strain traditional rules of access around the frame
of a forum for which they were never intended.
1. There Is Recognized Confidence in the Military System of Justice
The military system of justice, operating under the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, "' was created with guidance from Congress. The Supreme Court,
in Schlesinger v. Councilman, pronounced its faith in the ability of this system
to be fair by characterizing it as one "carefully designed to protect not only
military interests but [a defendant's] legitimate interests as well."'36 The Court
continued: "deference . . . should be accorded [to] the judgments of the care-
fully designed military justice system established by Congress."'37 In a most
130 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art 4, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (in order to be eligible to receive the protection of a
prisoner of war, "members of other militias [or] volunteer corps., including those of organ-
ized resistance movements [must] ... be commanded by a person responsible for his subor-
dinates ... have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance . . . carry arms openly
[and] ... conduct.. .operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war").
131 Military Order, supra note 6, at 919 ("The term 'individual subject to this order' shall
mean any individual who is not a United States citizen ... ").
132 DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(b)(3). Appropriate closure can be undertaken to pro-
tect classified information, a participant's or prospective witness's physical safety, and
"other national security interests." Id. But the Military Order explicitly states that
"[p]roceedings should be open to the maximum extent practicable." Id. (emphasis added).
133 See Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at
A 18 (recognizing that over 3,000 lives were lost on September 11th and describing Bin
Laden's appetite for violence and revenge as "gargantuan.").
134 See DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(b)(3).
135 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2000).
136 See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 760 (1975).
137 Id. at 753.
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striking endorsement of military justice, the Court wrote, "[I]t must be as-
sumed that the military court system will vindicate servicemen's constitutional
rights."'38
Recently, intellectuals with divergent views have found common ground on
the issue of the ability of military tribunals to try non-citizen military combat-
ants. Writing for the National Review, Judge Robert Bork called military
courts "superior to the run of civilian courts, more scrupulous in examining the
evidence and following the plain import of the law."'39 In addition to Judge
Bork's comments and the endorsement from the Supreme Court in Schlesinger,
Harvard University constitutional law professor Laurence H. Tribe notes that
"[w]e consider military tribunals sufficiently impartial to judge our own mili-
tary personnel accused of crimes. Why should members of Al Qaida and those
who aid them enjoy a constitutional right to a theoretically purer form of jus-
tice than our own soldiers?"'4 °
2. The Geneva Convention Does Not Apply to Members ofAl Qaida
A crime committed in the United States by a citizen of one state against a
citizen of another state may find its way to federal court. The defendant will be
given a whole host of rights during the course of his trial. Since criminal pro-
ceedings in the United States are traditionally open to the public, the trial will
be publicly accessible to private citizens and exposed to the scrutiny of the
media. "' This openness will ensure "respect for the judicial process," will as-
sure the public of the proceedings' fairness,'42 and will "serve an important
prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility,
and emotion."'43 Both Richmond Newspapers, Inc. and Globe Newspaper Co.,
citing the traditional First Amendment right of access cautioned against blan-
ket closure of criminal proceedings.'" Defendants facing a military tribunal,
however, are not quite in the same position and therefore should not be tried
138 Id. at 759.
139 See Bork, supra note 129, at 18.
140 Laurence H. Tribe, Why Congress Must Curb Bush's Military Courts, NEW REPUBLIC,
Dec. 10, 2001, at 18, 18.
141 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) ("[A] pre-
sumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of jus-
tice."); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982) ("[T]he
criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public.").
142 Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606.
143 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 571.
144 Id. at 576 ("The First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to
the public at the time that Amendment was adopted." (emphasis added)); see also Globe
Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 608 (holding that even the compelling interest of the statute did
not justify mandatory closure).
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under the same rules.
It would be difficult to argue that members of Al Qaida are not "unlawful
combatant[s]" as defined under Ex parte Quirin,"' and that they do not attack
Americans with the purpose of causing immense destruction to life or property.
It would be equally impossible to demonstrate what Al Qaida "uniforms" look
like. 46 Under Exparte Quirin's definition of who is eligible to be tried by mili-
tary tribunal, it is clear that members of Al Qaida are eligible.
It is equally clear that they should not be treated as prisoners of war
("POW") under the Geneva Convention. To be treated as such, combatants
must at a minimum, "(1) be commanded by a person responsible for subordi-
nates; (2) have a fixed and distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; (3)
carry arms openly; and (4) operate in accordance with the laws and customs of
war."
147
Al Qaida members should not be given the benefit of POW status for several
reasons. First, although Al Qaida is led by heads and commanders "[t]his or-
ganizational structure should not be read as defining a hierarchical chain of
command... [instead] it serves as a means for coordinating functions and pro-
viding material support to operations."'48 Today Al Qaida is best described as
"a loose collection of regional networks with a greatly weakened central or-
ganization."'49 Al Qaida is a guerilla terrorist organization, not an army that
answers to a chain of command. 5 Second, operational secrecy is one of the
network's primary and favored methods of organizing attacks.' They have no
recognizable uniforms and rarely carry weapons openly.'52 Finally, Al Qaida
makes no attempt to comply with the law of war that forbid the targeting of
civilians. Their "choice to carry out the [September 1 th] attacks during the
145 See supra note 24.
146 Id. One of the principle differences between unlawful belligerents and soldiers, that
are entitled to the full protection of the Geneva Convention, is that belligerents "secretly and
without uniform pass[] the military lines ... in time of war ..." (emphasis added).
147 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
130; see also Wedgwood, supra note 133 ("[Al Qaida] disregarded two fundamental princi-
ples of morality and law in war-never deliberately attack civilians, and never seek dispro-
portionate damage to civilians in pursuit of another objective.").
148 See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, STAFF
STATEMENT No. 15, at 3 (2004), http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-
1 _commission/040616-staffstatement_ 15.pdf.
"49 Id.
150 Id. at 11 ("The organization is far more decentralized. Bin Laden's seclusion forced
operation commanders and cell leaders .. .to make[] .. .decisions previously made by
him.").
151 Id. Al Qaida operatives have perpetrated numerous attacks on the United States since
the early 1990s but until recently, most high-ranking officials have successfully evaded
capture.
152 Id. at3, 11.
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morning rush hour, reveals this [fact].'" 53 By providing members of Al Qaida
with the same protections given to soldiers who follow the rule of law, our sys-
tem of justice would be providing a disincentive to soldiers to act within the
structures of the Geneva Conventions during combat. As put by David Rivkin,
Jr., a member of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights:
There have to be distinctions between how you treat POW's 54 and Non-POW's. Non-
POW's get the floor, POW's get the ceiling. There has to be some difference between the
two .... [N]ot everybody is created the same and it's not a question of inhumanity, it's a
question of profound symbolism and an effort to delegitimize these people.
55
3. Only Non-Citizens Will Be Tried by Tribunal
The only persons that may be tried by a military tribunal are non-citizens.'56
The fear that an average American would ever be subjected to a military tribu-
nal is unfounded. The current test for trying a defendant before a court-martial
is "one of status, namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding
is a person who can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval
Forces.""" Just as jurisdiction of courts-martial is based on classification as a
member of the armed forces, jurisdiction for military tribunals would be based
on classification as an "unlawful combatant"'5 5 and "non-citizen."'59 A person
dressed in military garb, committing a crime that stems from his military re-
sponsibilities during a time of war would be the most likely candidate to be
153 Wedgwood, supra note 133.
154 POW is an abbreviation for prisoner of war. The term is defined as "[a] person [usu-
ally] a solider, who is captured by or surrender to the enemy in wartime." BLACKS' LAW
DICTIONARY 1233 (8th ed. 2004).
155 Video tape: Symposium on the Geneva Convention and the Rules of War in the Post-
9/11 and Iraq World (Mar. 24, 2005) (comments of David B. Rivkin, Jr., Partner, Baker &
Hostetler, LLP, member of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights) (video on file with American University's Pence Law Library).
t56 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
157 See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987) (quoting Kinsella v. United
States, ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1960)) ("Without contradiction, the materi-
als ... show that military jurisdiction has always been based on the 'status' of the accused,
rather than on the nature of the offense."). Even though Solorio was a court-martial and not
a military tribunal, the argument in Solorio that jurisdiction should be based on status can
easily be extended to military tribunals, which arguably more closely resemble courts-
martial than do regular criminal proceedings.
158 See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942).
159 See Military Order, supra note 6, at 919 (persons subject to the order include but are
not limited to those who are or were "at relevant times" members of Al Qaida, those who
engage in, aid, abet, or conspire to commit acts of international terrorism or those who har-
bor such individuals); see also id. ("The term 'individual subject to this order' shall mean
any individual who is not a United States citizen .... ).
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tried by a tribunal. 6 ' A citizen committing a domestic crime does not fit this
description.
The Military Order was not designed to retain a jurisdictional reach over or-
dinary citizens; instead, it asserts jurisdiction primarily over members of Al
Qaida who engage in international terrorism and those who render assistance to
them. 6' Domestic crimes are specifically excluded.6 2 Further, "non-citizens do
not have the same Constitutional rights as citizens-they are not allowed to
vote, not allowed to remain in the country without the proper documentation,
not allowed to remain indefinitely-and as such are subject to more intense
scrutiny."' 63 "[T]here is no Constitutional obligation to allow aliens in the
country in the first place," says Mike Ramsey, University of San Diego, School
of Law professor." Therefore, even though the DOD Order provides defen-
dants most of the legal protections guaranteed to citizens, and seeks to ensure
"a full and fair trial," the protections provided are not required to be identi-
cal.
65
4. Military Commission Guidelines Do Not Allow for Blanket Closure
The majority of the statutes and proceedings struck down in the First
Amendment case law referenced above were situations where statutes or
judges mandated blanket closure of the proceedings without engaging in indi-
160 See Video tape: Symposium on the Geneva Convention and the Rules of War in the
Post-9/11 and Iraq World (Mar. 24, 2005) (comments of Patricia Wildermuth, Colonel, U.S.
Air Force, Office of Military Commissions, Department of Defense) ("Military Commis-
sions, traditionally with in the history of the United States have been the forum of choice for
violations of war of our enemies. They are not new, they are not novel.") (video on file with
American University's Pence Law Library).
161 See Military Order, supra note 6, at 919.
162 See id. The order applies to individuals that have "engaged in, aided or abetted...
acts of international terrorism." See also Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439. The crux of the holding
mandates that the accused individual's status be adjudicated as a member of the armed
forces in order for jurisdiction to be asserted. This reinforces the idea that citizens will not
find themselves embroiled in courts-martial for non-military related crimes and that they
have equally nothing to fear from a military tribunal. If civilians cannot be tried by courts-
martial because their crimes are too attenuated from the military's jurisdiction and then they
certainly will not qualify for trial under military tribunals without disturbing the underlying
purpose that tribunals serve, namely to bring non-citizen enemy combatants to justice.
163 Susan Herold, The Law of War, USD MAGAZINE, Winter 2002, at 14, 14.
164 Id.
165 See generally Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (2004) (denying the writ of ha-
beas corpus to German nationals, confined in the custody of U. S. Army in Germany follow-
ing conviction by military commission of having engaged in military activity against the
United States in China after surrender of Germany); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct.
2633, 2672, 2673 (2004) (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("Citizens and non-citizens, even if equally
dangerous, are not similarly situated.").
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vidual fact-finding or examining the circumstances before them.'66 In Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down the Virginia Supreme
Court's decision to uphold the right of a judge to close criminal proceedings in
a murder trial. Defense counsel, frustrated with previous problems of informa-
tion being leaked to the media'67 and the delay of three previous trials, con-
vinced the trial judge to close the trial because the first three attempts by the
state to convict the defendant were overturned for a variety of reasons. How-
ever, on appeal, the closure order was overturned because no specific on the
record findings were made regarding the closure and "absent an overriding
interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the
public."'68
In Globe Newspaper Co., the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts
law that closed proceedings in cases where minors had been sexually as-
saulted.'69 The Commonwealth argued that the statute encouraged minors to
come forward with charges of abuse and protected them from the risks of psy-
chological harm. 7 Though the Court recognized this legitimate state interest,
they held that the statute was not tailored narrowly enough to survive a First
Amendment challenge. 7 ' The Globe Newspaper Co. Court condemned the stat-
ute for permitting blanket closure of the proceedings, especially when the state
could not empirically prove that the statute encouraged victims to come for-
ward. 7'
The DOD Order, unlike the closures at issue in the preceding two cases,
does not provide for the blanket or mandatory closure that Globe Newspaper
Co. and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. prohibit.'73 In fact, the DOD Order spe-
cifically mandates that "[p]roceedings should be open to the maximum extent
practicable. ""' The DOD Order places the question of closure in the hands of
166 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) ("[T]he First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from
summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time that
Amendment was adopted." (emphasis added)); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982) (holding that even the compelling interest of the statute did
not justify a mandatory closure rule).
167 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 561.
168 Id. at 581.
169 Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 596.
170 Id at 598.
'1 Id. at 6 10-1!.
172 Id. at 609 ("The Commonwealth has offered no empirical support for the claim that
the rule of automatic closure ... will lead to an increase in the number of minor sex victims
coming forward and cooperating with state authorities.").
173 See DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(d)(5)(i)(A)-(E). The Order specifically deline-
ates when appropriate closure can be undertaken, such as to protect classified information,
the physical safety of participants or prospective witnesses and for other concerns. Id §
9.6(b)(3).
174 Id. § 9.6(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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the Presiding Officer, who would be hard-pressed to justify a blanket order that
purports to restrict access to the entire proceeding.'75 The Order contains nu-
merous provisions for protecting witnesses, testimony, and information.'76 This
cumulatively indicates that the Presiding Officer must be flexible in determin-
ing which portions of the proceedings can be open and which must be closed.
By detailing when closure is appropriate and when it is not, and by explicitly
allowing for the attendance of the public and the press, and for the release of
transcripts,'77 the guidelines for military tribunals, when invoked to protect a
demonstrable piece of national security information, would undoubtedly sur-
vive the required standard of strict scrutiny.'
5. Terrorist Threat: Greater Threat Warrants Greater Restriction
The aforementioned cases that guarantee a First Amendment right to a pub-
lic trial all involve domestic common law and statutory crimes, such as robber-
ies, rapes, or murders. Military tribunals are reserved for non-citizen enemy
combatants who violate the laws of war.'79 These are crimes on a larger scale 8 °
which are historically tried by the military'8 ' under the law of nations. Each
case that ensures the right to an open trial under the First Amendment is a case
dealing with common law crimes, a fact pointed out by Chief Justice Burger in
a footnote to Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 's holding.'82
Previous case law has textually circumscribed the First Amendment right to
175 Id. § 9.4(a)(5)
176 Id. § 9.6(b)(3) (provision for closing proceedings); id. § 9.6(d)(2)(i) (provision for
protection of witnesses); id. § 9.6(D)(5)(i)(A) (provision for protecting information).
177 Id. § 9.6(b)(3).
178 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (holding that
the state must show a "compelling governmental interest" that is "narrowly tailored to serve
that interest" if they wish to restrict access to a proceeding).
179 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines "law of war" as:
The body of rules and principles observed by civilized nations for the regulation of
matters inherent or incidental to the conduct of public war, such as the relations of neu-
trals and belligerents, blockades, captures ... prisoners, and declarations of war and
peace.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 895 (8th ed. 2004).
180 See Kevin Drew, Tribunals Break Sharply from Civilian Courts, CNN.COM, Dec. 7,
2001, http://edition.cnn.com/200I/LAW/l2/06/inv.tribunals.explainer/ ("These are not ordi-
nary criminal defendants, in the sense that even someone who commits a grievous crime as
an isolated murder does not have as their fundamental purpose bringing down an entire so-
ciety.").
181 See Wedgwood, supra note 133.
182 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 574 n.9 (1980) (quoting In
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266 (1948)) ("[We] have been unable to find a single instance of a
criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state or municipal court during the history
of this country. Nor have we found any record of even one such secret criminal trial in Eng-
land.").
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a public trial to criminal trials only. A trial is not a tribunal; the two are differ-
ent in procedure and concern. Trials take place in time of peace and try citizens
for ordinary criminal offenses. "They are built for a system that would rather
see 100 guilty men go free than to convict one innocent accused."'83 Article III
courts "are skewed toward acquitting the guilty.' ' 4 "This is laudable for peace-
time America, but wholly unsatisfactory in a war against terrorism that has
already resulted in the loss of thousands of lives, leaving untold thousands or
millions in further jeopardy."' 85
Unlike trials, tribunals are reserved solely for non-citizen enemy combatants
during the backdrop of an armed conflict. Tribunals further contain the added
danger that these defendants, if released, will likely return to the battlefield,
taking up arms against the country that chose to free them.'86 It is worth noting
that Ex parte Quirin, the case that upholds the constitutionality of military tri-
bunals, was, unlike Article III proceedings, closed to the public.'87
Alternatively, some may contend that because of the enormous magnitude of
the offense perpetrated, terrorist trials should be afforded more access than
regular criminal proceedings. Such crimes are often gruesome and usually pro-
voke severe public outrage. Some may argue that this heightened emotional
response makes the need for public exposure that much greater, so as to ensure
fairness of process. Although such oversight is important, an argument in favor
of unfettered expansion is specious as it only considers one side of the equa-
tion. Most notably, such arguments forget that the test of access needs to bal-
ance the right of access with the need for closure.'88 Overt favoritism of one
183 Tribe, supra note 140, at 20 ("The old adage that is it better to free 100 guilty men
than to imprison one innocent describes a calculus that our Constitution ... does not impose
on government when the 100 who are freed belong to terrorist cells that slaughter innocent
civilians .... ).
184 Byard Q. Clemmons, The Case for Military Tribunals, 49 FED. LAW. 27, 31 (2002).
185 Id.
186 Gordon England, Secretary of the U.S. Navy, Special Defense Department Briefing
on Status of Military Tribunals (Dec. 20, 2004),
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/2004/tr20041220-1841.htm. ("There's been as least 12.
. detainees that have been ... released ... from Guantanamo that have indeed returned to
terrorism .... ); see also Video tape: Symposium on the Geneva Convention and the Rules
of War in the Post-9/11 and Iraq World (Mar. 24, 2005) (comments of Colonel Manuel Su-
pervielle, Executive Officer and Special Counsel to the Office of General Counsel, Depart-
ment of the Army) ("The single biggest concern, overriding everything else, was the safety
of our troops who were guarding these guys in Guantanamo. This is not a case of the tradi-
tional enemy prisoner of war from a nation state. These guys, many of them said 'we will
continue to try to kill you if given the opportunity."') (video on file with American Univer-
sity's Pence Law Library).
187 See REPORTER'S COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 17.
188 See United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116, 121-22 (C.M.A. 1977) (proposing a differ-
ent test when classified information or matters of national security may be involved. The
court held that the judge's "initial task is to determine whether the perceived need urged as
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prong comes at the detriment of the other and possibly the entire process. The
Military Order'89 recognizes the need for balancing both considerations of pub-
lic assurance of fairness and protection of sensitive information. In doing so, it
strikes a correct balance between both sides. The DOD Order provides for pub-
lic oversight and stresses the need for an open process, 9 ' but it does not do so
blindly. 9 '
6. Tribunal Proceedings Will Be Predominantly Open
In addition to the express language found in the Military Order, there are
other indicators that military officials anticipate these tribunals to be public.
First, the DOD Order's emphasis on the maintenance of open proceedings is in
line with the language of Powell that absent "'cause shown that outweighs the
value of openness,' the accused is entitled to a public trial."'92 Second, there is
a media center contained in the facility at Guantanamo Bay, to which members
of the press have access.'93 Unless such access was anticipated and encouraged,
there would have been no need to provide such a facility. In this facility, mem-
bers of the press have the right to observe proceedings through a delayed video
feed.'94 The delay is present to allow the feed to be cut off if a defendant were
to reveal classified information.'95 General Hemingway, Legal Advisor to the
Appointing Authority, Office of Military Commissions, for the DOD explains:
[T]here is a time delay on the feed to the remote installation where the media are also view-
ing. That's done for national security reasons. And if there is improper disclosure of secure
or classified information during the course of the proceedings, the commission room would
have to immediately be cleared. And of course, people who were in there would have to be
given a cautionary instruction.
96
grounds for exclusion outweigh[s] the danger of miscarriage of justice which may attend
judicial proceedings carried out in even partial secrecy." (quoting Stamicarbon, N.V. v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 506 F. 2d 532, 539 (2d Cir. 1974))).
189 Military Order, supra note 6, at 918.
190 DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(b)(3).
191 The mechanisms the DOD Order employs to ensure the balance between openness
and the protection of sensitive information are discussed in length in the next section.
192 See ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (quoting Press-Enter. v.
Super. Ct. (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984)).
193 See Brigadier General Thomas Hemingway, Legal Advisor for the Office of Military
Commissions, address before members of the press in the Media Center in Guantanamo
Bay: Defense Department Briefing on Preliminary Hearing for Guantanamo Detainees
(Aug. 26, 2004), http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2004/08/sec-040826-
dod0l.htm (illustrating how the closure process would work, including delayed feeds of
information, and other types of restrictions-on media access).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
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B. Traditional Rules of Access Cannot Adequately Deal With Terrorist Trials
Federal courts and traditional rules of access are not equipped to deal with
the myriad of new safety concerns that arise when terrorists are on trial in Arti-
cle III courts. Terrorist trials of this sort pose an immense threat to juror
safety.'97 In addition, a proceeding in open federal court would provide terror-
ists not only a forum in which to expound their message of hate and evil
against the West, but also a convenient "bully pulpit" in which to instruct other
members of their groups to commit more terrorist attacks.'98 Because of these
concerns, very few trials of this nature have ever been tried in a federal court.'99
Perhaps the most compelling argument for closure is the necessity of guard-
ing against the dissemination of classified and potentially damaging informa-
tion in the public record, which an Article III court would inevitably have to
provide. Should transcripts containing classified information become available
for terrorists to see, it would be tantamount to aiding the enemy."' Also, fed-
eral judges lack experience in dealing with certain military matters, such as the
detention of enemy combatants and protecting classified information.
When not properly considered, these concerns can be damaging not only to
trial participants but to the security of the country as well. Terrorists and
criminal defendants do not pose equal threats to society. The concerns sur-
rounding the trial of the former are simply not present when the latter is on
trial. Therefore, while recognizing that the regular criminal defendant retains a
First Amendment right to a public trial, the concerns surrounding the trial of
terrorists are too dissimilar to allow the same procedures to be used.
1. Traditional Right ofAccess Could Endanger Trial Participants
Terrorists have the potential to compromise the safety of the judge, the
prosecutor, and the jury-all of whom may become potential terrorist targets
not only during the process, but also for the rest of their lives.2"' In a regular
criminal proceeding, the press and public have a right to access the entire trial
proceedings including the voir dire process and the names of the individual
jurors once each is chosen. 22 In these types of trials, such routine disclosures
are generally not of much concern, but when the defendant is a terrorist who
197 See Wedgwood, supra note 133.
198 Bork, supra note 129, at 18.
199 See Wedgwood, supra note 133.
200 Id.; see also Bork, supra note 129, at 18.
201 Clemmons, supra note 184, at 31; see also Wedgwood, supra note 133.
202 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
("[S]ince the development of trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presump-
tively been a public process .... " (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-
Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984)).
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may retain control over a covert terrorist cell operating in the area, the poten-
tial for harm to the juror, the judge, and their family members is compounded
exponentially. Professor Ruth Wedgwood considers a frightening, albeit possi-
ble, consequence of trying terrorists in federal court:
It is hard to imagine assigning three carloads of federal marshals, rotated every two weeks,
to protect each juror for the rest of his life. An Al Qaida member trained in surveillance can
easily follow jurors home, even when their names are kept anonymous. Perhaps it is only
coincidence that the World Trade Center towers toppled the day before Al Qaida defen-
dants were due to be sentenced for the earlier bombings of East Africa embassies-in a
federal courthouse in lower Manhattan six blocks away.
2
0
3
The Presiding Officer in a military tribunal has the option of keeping the se-
lection and identity of jurors secret, an option federal judges generally do not
retain. 4 Even if the selection of jurors in a federal trial was closed and trial
participants' names were kept anonymous, there would be no assurance of
their safety. A military tribunal sits on an American military base or at an un-
disclosed location, making safeguarding each juror's identity much more man-
ageable. Further, and perhaps more compelling, tribunals consist of a jury
comprised wholly of members of the armed forces who are well versed in the
operations surrounding the war on terrorism and fully realize its breadth. It
makes more "sense to place this process in the hands of those trained profes-
sionals who have volunteered to fight the war on terrorism[,]" than to place it
in the form of a target on the back of an average American and his family." 5
2. Traditional Rights ofAccess Provides Terrorists With a "Bully Pulpit'"
In addition to the safety of the trial participants, allowing the general public
and the media access under the traditional rules would provide terrorist defen-
dants with an audience to whom to preach. We cannot allow the First Amend-
ment to provide a dangerous "bully pulpit," for terrorists from which to preach
their message of hate against the West and possibly stir others to commit more
terrorist attacks 26 or to complicate relations between the United States and
other Islamic governments.' The closed proceedings of a military tribunal can
203 Wedgwood, supra note 133.
204 See id.
205 Clemmons, supra note 184, at 31.
206 Bork, supra note 129, at 18 (claiming that an open trial "covered by television, would
be an ideal stage for an Osama bin Laden to spread his propaganda to all the Muslims in the
world."); see also Clemmons, supra note 184, at 31 ("[P]ublic trials serve as a bully pulpit
for terrorists who want to claim martyrdom and incite further violence."); Tribe, supra note
140, at 20 ("Nonmilitary trials grant an extended pulpit to an accused [who is] ... capable
of stirring others to further acts of violent terror.").
207 Bork, supra note 129, at 18 (as a result of a publicized trial "[m]any Islamic govern-
ments would likely find that aroused mobs make it impossible to continue cooperating with
the U.S.").
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help guard against these problems by providing a filter between the terrorists'
messages and whom they will reach. By prohibiting videotaping, audio re-
cording, or any other instantaneous type of transmission of the proceedings. 8 a
military tribunal limits transmission of the proceedings to second-hand non-
verbatim communication, either through the notes of a journalist or the mem-
ory of an observer. By limiting the dissemination of information in this way, it
is less likely that terrorist messages will be effectively spread directly or un-
knowingly through newspaper reports.
Besides placing much needed restrictions on public access to tribunals, the
DOD Order guarantees the right of the accused to be present at every proceed-
ing but limits that right by allowing for his removal if he engages in "disrup-
tive conduct."2 °9 This provision, obviously aimed at preventing the accused
from preaching potentially dangerous messages in the court room, demon-
strates once again how the DOD Order guidelines recognize First Amendment
rights for the accused, but also has built-in balancing devices that federal
courts do not.
3. Traditional Rights ofAccess and Inexperienced Judges Cannot Protect
Classified Information
Finally, and perhaps the most compelling reason that the rules governing
military tribunals must differ from the traditional access, is the need to protect
classified information and its collection methods. These subjects will inevita-
bly be a major part of any terrorist trial and require particular attention. Gener-
ally, regular criminal proceedings are not fraught with matters of national secu-
rity and do not contain reams of classified evidence and information. Most fed-
eral judges and juries do not have the requisite security clearance to access
classified information that a tribunal Presiding Officer and military jury
have." ' Furthermore, it is doubtful that many federal judges have the experi-
ence to deal with such information.2 ' It is not contended that no federal judge
has ever accessed classified information. However, since knowledge of sources
and methods of intelligence collection, along with the information gathered
from them are of great value to the United States,"2 it is more logical to limit
dissemination of such sensitive information to persons who are exposed to it
on a daily basis and to those familiar with procedures for its handling.
208 See DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(b)(3).
209 Id. § 9.5(k).
210 See Clemmons, supra note 184, at 31.
211 Wedgwood, supra note 133 (explaining that federal judges have never heard these
types of case).
212 Clemmons, supra note 184, at 31 (calling the protection of sensitive and classified
information "important to protect our national security interests").
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Traditional First Amendment rules of access, applicable in Article III courts,
are comparably ill-equipped to address national security concerns, as those
rules do not permit closure to protect sensitive but unclassified information.2"
Such rules would require witnesses to testify in open court about the substan-
tive nature of the intelligence, how it was gathered, and from whom."4 In a
recent article, Judge Bork quotes Charles Krauthammer, a Pulitzer Prize-
winning journalist for the Washington Post, in detailing a chilling consequence
of applying traditional First Amendment rights of access to terrorist trials: "In
the trials of the bombers of our embassies in Africa, the prosecution had to
reveal that the United States had intercepted bin Laden's satellite phone calls:
'As soon as that testimony was published, Osama stopped using the satellite
system and went silent. We lost him. Until Sept. I L"25
Dissemination to the press and public of the testimony of agents who gather
information on terrorist defendants would invariably also reach other terrorists.
Such dissemination would almost assuredly result in the devastating conse-
quences like those that resulted from disclosing the federal government's
awareness of Osama Bin Laden's satellite communications. Revealing sensi-
tive information in such a manner would be ill-advised and tantamount to aid-
ing the enemy." 6 As Professor Wedgwood puts it, "[e]ndangering America's
cities with a repeat performance is a foolish act."2 7 Traditional treatments of
the First Amendment are simply unworkable to protect classified information
in the context of a terrorist trial. National security concerns surrounding evi-
dence and testimony are too plentiful to allow similar access to these proceed-
ings.
V. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TESTS: ADEQUACIES
AND INADEQUACIES
The case law pertaining to the First Amendment right of access to the courts
is lengthy, and the tests set forth to protect and guarantee that right are numer-
ous. These tests have been applied in abundance to courts-martial proceedings,
but military courts have yet to speak on the application of these tests to mili-
tary tribunals. Yet, the application of these tests to the military tribunal have
been lacking does not mean that the framework set forth in some of these cases
is impractical or unnecessary. Although not all of the tests employed by courts
213 Wedgwood, supra note 133 ("The 1980 Classified Information Procedures Act ...
doesn't permit closing the trial or the protection of equally sensitive unclassified operational
information.").
214 See Bork, supra note 129, at 18.
215 Id.
216 See Wedgwood, supra note 133.
217 Id.
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to guarantee the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials can and
should be applied to military commissions. However, some of the more com-
mon elements of these tests (namely those that recognize military tribunals
more closely resemble a court-martial than a civilian trial) are workable when
applied to military commissions.
By arguing for the trial of non-citizens by military commissions, this Com-
ment contends that there is a middle ground between the two extreme options:
the Press-Enterprise II test and blanket non-disclosure.
A. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
The Richmond Newspapers, Inc. decision is an inadequate predicate from
which to assert that a First Amendment right of access applies to military tri-
bunals. First, the language in the decision addresses criminal trials; nowhere in
the case is application of the rule to military tribunals contemplated.2 8 One
might argue that military tribunals are criminal trials; however, it is unlikely
that the Court was contemplating a twenty-first century military tribunal when
addressing a Virginia murder prosecution in 1980.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. also argues against "summarily closing court-
room doors" 2 9-- authority that the DOD Order does not give to the Presiding
Officer in a military tribunal. 220 Instead of authorizing overarching closure, the
DOD Order grants a Presiding Officer the discretion to "close all or part of a
proceeding...""' if he or she finds certain enumerated situations exist. How-
ever, he has no power to restrict access to the entire process without cause. The
use of"a" instead of the word "the" in the guidelines is a further indicator that
the Presiding Officer must make individual findings to justify closure of each
portion of the proceedings and would not have the power to initiate a blanket
closure.
B. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court
In Globe Newspaper Co., the Court acknowledged that criminal trials have
historically been open to the press. Once again, this may be true of criminal
trials, but it would be a mistake to try to extend the right of access established
in Globe Newspaper Co. to a military proceeding. This is especially true once
218 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) ("[T]he right
to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment." (emphasis
added)); see also id. at 573 ("[A] presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a
criminal trial." (emphasis added)).
219 Id. at 576.
220 See DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(b)(3)
221 Id.
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one considers that Ex parte Quirin, the case that established the constitutional-
ity of military tribunals, was a closed proceeding. 22 The two proceedings are
simply too different. A court-martial, which more closely resembles a military
tribunal than a criminal proceeding, is much more hospitable to the idea of clo-
sure.
In courts-martial, there is a fundamental understanding and appreciation of
the necessity to protect the information that will inevitably be part of that type
of proceeding. This understanding may generally be lacking or unappreciated
in a regular criminal trial.223 In Globe Newspaper Co., the Court applied a strict
scrutiny test to the state's request to restrict access to sensitive information.
The Court wrote, "it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compel-
ling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 22 4 A
footnote in the case mentions that time, place, and manner restrictions would
not have to meet such a high threshold-a point was not stressed in the body of
the opinion.2
The Globe Newspaper Co. test is inadequate when applied to tribunals for
two reasons. First, tribunals seek to protect not only classified but also sensi-
tive information. Classified information is subject to a higher level of protec-
tion than sensitive information, and the disclosure of either can potentially
jeopardize national security if shown to parties not cleared to access it.226 Globe
Newspaper Co.'s test is one of strict scrutiny-a threshold which sensitive in-
formation but unclassified information might have a tough time surmounting.
Classified information is not the only information that needs limits on dissemi-
nation; sensitive information needs to be given the same protection. The lower
threshold of discretionary authority given to the Presiding Officer in a military
tribunal is more appropriate than Globe Newspaper Co. 's inadequately high
standard.
Second, the methods of closure employed by the DOD Order can all be clas-
sified as time, place, and manner restrictions; there is no attempt at blanket
closure. The DOD Order allows for "public release of transcripts at the appro-
222 See REPORTER'S COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 17.
223 See ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363 (C.A.A.F. 1997); see also United States v.
Grunden, 2 M.J. 116, 120 (C.M.A. 1977) (the holding makes numerous references to the
many instances where a trial can be closed over defense's objection and states that "that the
right to a public trial is not absolute."); United States v. Scott, 48 M. J. 663, 665 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. 1998) (quoting Press-Enter. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise 1), 464 U.S.
501, 104 (1984) (holding that a court-martial can be closed if an "overriding interest justi-
fies closure.")).
224 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
225 Id. at 607 n.17 ("Of course, limitations on the right of access that resemble time,
place, and manner restrictions . . . would not be subject to such strict scrutiny." (quoting
Young v. Am. Mini theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976))).
226 See Exec. Order No. 12,985, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995).
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priate time" 227-a time restriction. The DOD Order provides that certain parts
of the record can be sealed, to be viewed only by "authorities in closed pro-
ceedings" 228 -a manner restriction. This Order also allows for attendance by
the press and public but prohibits "photography, video, or audio broadcasting,
or recording" 229-- another manner restriction. By allowing for partial closure as
opposed to blanket closure and only inhibiting certain types of access, the
DOD Order's restrictions fall well within time, place, and manner classifica-
tion and, therefore, are not required to meet the higher threshold of strict scru-
tiny outlined in Globe Newspaper Co..
C. Press-Enterprise H
In 1980, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. was the first case to guarantee a defen-
dant the First Amendment right to a public trial. Six years later, in Press-
Enterprise v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), the Supreme Court articu-
lated a detailed explanation of the exact rights of the accused and set forth the
test that an individual must overcome to deprive a defendant of that right. By
far the most comprehensive of any previous attempt to address such rights, the
Press-Enterprise II test permits closure of criminal proceedings only if specific
on the record findings demonstrate that "closure is essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored."23 The Press-Enterprise H test seeks to deter-
mine if "closure is essential to preserve higher values;" it is a two-pronged
"experience and logic" test. First, the trial court must determine, through ex-
perience, if there is a historical right of access to the proceedings."' Second,
the court must examine, logically, whether granting access would play a posi-
tive role in the judicial process or if there is pertinent information that needs
protection and warrants a closed proceeding.232 If both prongs are satisfied, a
First Amendment right of access is presumed, and the reasons for closure must
pass a test of strict scrutiny.233
One difficulty that arises when attempting to apply the Press-Enterprise H
test to tribunals is the application of the "experience" prong. "Since military
tribunals do not have much history, it is difficult to determine whether the [tri-
227 See DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(b)(3).
228 Id. § 9.6(d)(5)(iv).
229 Id. § 9.6(b)(3).
230 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 478 U.S. 1, 13-14
(1986).
231 Id. at 8-9.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 13-14 (explaining that the presumption may be overcome only by an overriding
interest based on findings "that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest").
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bunal] would rely on the presumptive openness of courts-martial as an example
of [historical right of access,] or whether they would look to battlefield tribu-
nals.... " such as in Ex parte Quirin or In re Yamashita."' Undoubtedly these
two fora are more closely related to a modem military tribunal than they are to
modem day Article III proceedings. Because such similarity exists, either fo-
rum would be a more appropriate comparison when making such a determina-
tion. It would be a fatal mistake to base such a determination for tribunals
solely on the historical right of access provided in regular criminal proceed-
ings.
The next potential problem with straining the rubric of the Press-Enterprise
I test to fit a military tribunal is the application of the "logic" prong. Under the
"logic" prong of the test, a fact finder may determine that it is logical to gener-
ally prefer public access to a trial as opposed to a trial in secret. Following that
line of reasoning, the test would find that a presumptive First Amendment right
of access would attach and closure would have to pass the test of strict scru-
tiny. However, this analysis is inadequate for the task of determining whether
it is logical to close military tribunals because it denies the fact that military
tribunals need to protect not only classified and secret information but also
information which has been deemed sensitive and may have a harder time
clearing the high hurdle of strict scrutiny.
Another potential question is whether the parsed access afforded under the
DOD Order qualifies as "public." Except for transcripts and notes taken by
those physically present at the proceeding, no recording of the proceedings of
any kind is allowed. In the Press-Enterprise H opinion, the Court acknowl-
edged: "it takes little imagination to recognize there are some types of gov-
ernment issues that would be totally frustrated if conducted openly." '235 One can
only hope that the type of operations bearing on national security that are rou-
tinely implicated in military tribunals were foreseeably contemplated.236
D. Powell and Scott: Military Case Law
Two cases from military appellate courts also help to highlight some of the
concerns surrounding the First Amendment right of access to military tribu-
nals. In 1997, an appellate court's review of the Article 32 investigation
"[made] it clear that, absent cause shown that outweighs the value of openness,
the military accused is likewise entitled to a public [trial]. ' 237 However, the
234 REPORTER'S COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 17.
235 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9.
236 Id. Though the opinion specifically listed grand jury proceedings as a government
operation whose objective would be compromised if conducted in the open, it is not hard to
extend this analogy to national security operations, which are undoubtedly more significant.
237 See ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 364 (C.A.A.F. 1997)
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Court tempered this statement by stating that "the right to a public hearing is
not absolute . . . [and] determinations must be made on a case-by-case, wit-
ness-by-witness, and circumstance-by-circumstance basis." '238 Additionally, the
court wanted to ensure that closure was reasoned and not reflexive.239
The language employed by the Military Court of Appeals in Powell is less
stringent than the language that pervades the opinions of general criminal pro-
ceedings. There is no mention of Globe Newspaper Co. 's requirement of "nar-
row tailoring,""24 nor is there any mention of the need to satisfy a "compelling
governmental interest," as set forth in Press-Enterprise ."24' To say decisions
of closure must be "reasoned" and made on a "case-by-case" basis is to merely
advocate to ensure an accused is afforded a full and fair trial. The more flexible
language in the Powell decision supports the conclusion that the military courts
are more hospitable to the idea of partially closed proceedings. This is proba-
bly the case because both judges and participants recognize the differences
between the two fora and are more cognizant of the inherent dangers that ac-
company unfettered access of the press and public. 42
The DOD Order adheres to the language in Powell, in so much that the
DOD Order defaults to a presumption of openness, but recognizes the special
nature surrounding evidence in a military type of trial. When referencing First
Amendment rights of access to modem day tribunals, Powell provides a much
more sound framework from which to begin an analysis. The tests set forth in
Globe Newspaper Co. and Press-Enterprise II require the Court to exercise
heightened scrutiny before a court can be closed. In contrast, the test set forth
in Powell lowers the hurdle the government must overcome when seeking clo-
sure. The language in Powell strikes a more workable balance between the
First Amendment right of access and national security and should be adopted
by military tribunals. When examining the DOD Order in light of the Powell
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) ("[1]t must be
shown that the denial [of access] is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.").
241 See Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 9 ("The presumption [of openness] may be over-
come only by an overriding interest based on the findings that the closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.").
242 E.g., United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 532 (C.M.A. 1954). The court
specifically recognizes the differences between the two types of tribunals by holding that:
[T]he rights of the man in the service must be proportioned by a more refined measur-
ing rod than are those belonging to the man in the street. What may be questionable
behavior in civilian life, and yet not present any danger to our form of Government,
may be fatal if carried on in the military community. The substantial interest of society
with which we deal must be weighed on scales adjusted to the necessities of the mili-
tary service ....
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test, it is evident that the DOD Order is in line with the language of Powell.
The first line of § 9.6(b) of the DOD Order charges the commission with
providing a "full and fair trial" and reiterates that standard in the subsequent
sections.243 It also provides for "open proceedings except where otherwise de-
cided by the Appointing Authority. .... .24 Unless closure outweighs openness,
"the military accused is likewise entitled to a public [trial].""24 Additionally, the
DOD Order lists only a few specific instances in which closure would be ap-
propriate, some of which are protection for: (1) classified information; (2) wit-
nesses; (3) intelligence methods; or (4) law enforcement collection methods.246
By delineating the circumstances in which closure is appropriate, and by pre-
cluding blanket closure, the DOD Order forces Presiding Officers to make
case-by-case and circumstance-by-circumstance decisions regarding closure.
Such determinations demonstrate as well that the DOD Order follows the Pow-
ell requirement of particularized findings.
Finally, the DOD Order provides that "[t]he Presiding Officer may decide to
close all or part of a proceeding .... 24 When reading this section in conjunc-
tion with earlier language that mandates proceedings be kept open as much as
possible, this section once again can be construed as an attempt by the DOD
Order to conform to Powell's guidelines. 48
In 1998, just one year after Powell, the U.S. Army Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the First Amendment right of access in another court-martial proceed-
ing. 9 In United States v. Scott, the court reviewed a military judge's decision
to seal an entire factual stipulation offered by the U. S. Attorney regarding a
solider who was facing charges of sexual assault and attempted murder.2 ° Ul-
timately, the military judge's determination to seal the stipulation was rejected
by the Army Court of Criminal Appeals because the lower court judge did not
attempt to make separate findings on the record to justify his decision. 5 The
Army Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that "[the] right of public access to
243 See DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(b)(1)-(2).
244 Id. § 9.6(b)(3).
245 ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
246 DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(b)(3).
247 Id.
248 Id. There is one additional provision specifically delineated in the DOD Order than
can be read as quite expansive, it is the provision that allows for closure when "other na-
tional security" interests are implicated. DOD Order § 9.6(b)(3). Though some might read
this provision as an attempt to expand the possibilities of closure to the infinite, it was un-
doubtedly an attempt to include situations not contemplated at the time of drafting but im-
portant enough that their manifestation would still require the same degree of attention and
confidentiality, if they were to later arise.
249 United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (C.M.A. 1977).
250 United States v. Scott, 48 M.J. 663, 666 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).
251 Id. at 667 ("[W]e are left with no other conclusion to draw but that the military judge
abused his discretion in sealing the entire stipulation of fact.").
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criminal trials applies with equal validity to trials by courts-martial[J" 252 and
that "courts-martial shall be open to the public." '253 However, the court qualified
this right by noting that "[t]he presumption of openness may be overcome. 254
Once again, the language is softer than in Press-Enterprise II and more conge-
nial to the idea of closure. 55
Unnecessary blanket closure, such as those in the Scott case, is what the
above mentioned courts have condemned. It is a practice in which the DOD
Order also does not permit. In fact, the guidelines for military tribunals err on
the side of openness. Thus, the DOD Order allows for attendance at open pro-
ceedings "by the public and accredited press..." [and further allows for] "pub-
lic release of transcripts at the appropriate time." '256 Perhaps this helps to ex-
plain why the language in the Scott holding is harsher and seeks to invoke a
higher standard for closure than do most military tribunal cases.257
E. United States v. Grunden
In United States v. Grunden the issue before the Military Court of Appeals
was whether the First Amendment rights of access must give way when bal-
anced against sensitive national security concerns. Unlike the cases dealing
with a criminal proceeding, Grunden carves out a specific example where sen-
sitive national security concerns would lead to, at a minimum, a plausible cir-
cumstance for blanket closure. 5 8 The Grunden holding stands for the proposi-
tion that to prevent the disclosure of classified information, "all spectators may
be excluded from an entire trial, [even] over the accused's objection . "..."259
Nevertheless, the Grunden court maintained limits on this seemingly broad
allowance for closure by cautioning that "[t]he simple utilization of the terms
252 Id. at 665.
253 Id. (citing R. for Courts-Martial 806(a)).
254 Id.
255 But see id. Though the Scott decision quotes heavily from Press-Enterprise It and the
decision does indeed later invoke the harsher language utilized by many regular criminal
courts, this should not be seen as a military endorsement of that language or an application
of those standards to military law. Instead, the holding should be circumscribed to the facts
of the case.
256 DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(b)(3).
257 Scott, 48 M.J. at 666-67. Here, the judge was found to have abused his discretion by
issuing a blanket closure order without making any particularized on the record findings.
The invocation of such harsh language normally reserved for the opinions of general crimi-
nal proceedings, is appropriate when being used to strike down a unsubstantiated blanket
order of closure but would not be appropriate in other circumstances. Id.
258 See United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116, 121 (C.M.A. 1977) ("The blanket exclu-
sion of the spectators from all or most of a trial, such as in the present case, has not been
approved. .nor could it be absent a compelling showing that such was necessary to prevent
the disclosure of classjied information." (emphasis added)).
259 Id. (emphasis added).
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'security' or 'military necessity' . . ." will not allow constitutional protections
to vanish,260 and further maintained that the authority to exclude must be "cau-
tiously exercised . '. .."" Moreover, the opinion requires a nexus between na-
tional security and a justification for closure.
Once again, as in Powell and Scott, the language in Grunden is more flexi-
ble than the language one would find in the decision of an Article III court.
Because the language in military court decisions is less stringent in discussing
closure, and because the security issues surrounding tribunals are plentiful, it
would be more suitable to use these types of cases to form the basis of a mili-
tary tribunal right-of-access test. Here, the Gruden court is clearly aware of the
need to protect national security information and states that exclusion "on such
a basis can be justified. 262 Moreover, the Military Court of Appeals demon-
strates its cognizance of the special concerns that surround military tribunals to
which regular criminal courts may be blind: "This court recognizes that the
Supreme Court ... acknowledged the uniqueness of the military society, and
that it has reaffirmed that belief in recent decisions. '"263 Of all the judicial deci-
sions previously discussed, the Grunden test addresses this situation most ef-
fectively.
When balancing openness and security, the Grunden test laid out by the
Military Court of Appeals is by far the most workable that for tribunals. The
Presiding Officer's initial task is to determine "whether the perceived need
urged as grounds for the exclusion of the public is of sufficient magnitude so
as to outweigh 'the danger of a miscarriage of justice which may attend judi-
cial proceedings carried out in even partial secrecy."' 2 This determination is
made at a closed preliminary hearing where the government must demonstrate
the classified nature of the material it plans to use.265 Any classified informa-
tion that would implicate national security is given "special deference," '266 and
exclusion is ordered if "there is a reasonable danger that presentation of [such]
materials before the public will expose military matters which in the interest of
national security should not be divulged. 267
Once again, the use of softer, less stringent language in this military court
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 121 n.9 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
264 Id. at 122 (citing StamiCarbon, N.V. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 506 F. 2d 532, 539 (2d
Cir. 1974)).
265 Id. ("The prosecution to meet this heavy burden must demonstrate the classified na-
ture, if any, of the materials in question. It must then delineate those portions of its case
which will involve those materials.").
266 Id. (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir 1973)).
267 Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
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opinion is important. 6 A "reasonable danger" that classified information
would imperil national security is all the prosecution must demonstrate to af-
fect disclosure. This is by far the lowest threshold yet encountered to restrict
First Amendment access. Phrases such as "compelling governmental interest"
and "narrowly tailored" that connote the higher test of strict scrutiny are no-
where to be found in this decision. Ultimately, this demonstrates once again
how military courts retain an acute awareness of the issues surrounding the
unauthorized dissemination of classified material.
After the judge decides if openness will endanger national security informa-
tion, he must then "decide the scope of the exclusion of the public... [by ask-
ing t]he prosecution [to] delineate which witnesses will testify on classified
matters, and what portion of each witness' testimony will actually be devoted
to this area." '269 This second determination helps keep closure limited to the
areas solely devoted to classified information and helps preserve the accused's
right to a public trial, while still safeguarding the security of the nation. 7
Civilian criminal courts and judges often lack experience with classified, na-
tional security information and therefore fail to appreciate fully the need to
give such information adequate protection. When it comes to the trial of non-
citizen enemy combatants for acts of terrorism, any right of access test that
does not address such concerns will be dangerously inadequate. Because civil-
ian judges may not appreciate the harm that can arise when such information is
improperly disclosed, it is likely that tests created in civilian courts may inade-
quately address this issue. Rules of access governing military tribunals need to
be promulgated and cultivated by Presiding Officers in military courts who can
fully understand the importance of safeguarding such volatile and potentially
damaging information. The correct balance between openness and national
security will be maintained only when this occurs.
VI. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS: THE NATIONAL SECURITY GRAND
268 Compare Grunden, 2 M.J. at 121-122 (holding that a "reasonable danger" to national
security will permit disclosure), and ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363 (C.A.A.F. 1997)
("[C]losure... should ... be 'reasoned' and not 'reflexive."' (citing San Antonio Express-
News v. Morrow, 44 M.J. 706, 710 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996))), with Globe Newspaper v.
Superior Court 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (using much stronger language and deciding that a
denial of access must be "necessitated by a compelling government interest, and ... nar-
rowly tailored to serve that interest"), and Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-
Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (explaining that the presumption of openness can only
be overcome by a finding that "closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest").
269 Grunden, 2 M.J. at 123 ("This bifurcated presentation of a given witness' testimony
is the most satisfactory resolution of the competing needs for secrecy by the government and
for a public trial by the accused.").
270 Id.
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JURY MODEL
Courts take First Amendment free access rights seriously and because of the
historical foundation on which these rights rest, courts often reject efforts to
exclude the press and public when such efforts may be unjustified.27" ' The idea
that justice can be carried out in secret and without public scrutiny is antitheti-
cal to the historical American notions of open judicial proceedings.
The DOD and Military Orders attempt to secure a heightened level of se-
crecy during terrorist trials because of the sensitive and classified information
contained therein. The immense importance of this information and the impact
its dissemination could have on national security is no small matter of impor-
tance. Endangering intelligence materials, collection methods, sources, and
strategies by making them public knowledge would not only be irresponsible,
it would be an egregious breach of national security.
The nexus between these two competing concerns is where problems arise.
At some point, the right to a public trial and the protection of national security
must be reconciled. One way to do this is to use a grand jury model to provide
the accused with an audience that does not endanger national security. Grand
juries sit for between six to eighteen months. They are comprised of ordinary
citizens whose identities and deliberations are secret.272 A military tribunal
could employ similar techniques and almost ensure against dissemination of
sensitive information to dangerous parties.
Much like a civilian secret grand jury, tribunal jurors could be selected from
government and military personnel who already have the requisite security
clearances to access classified information. By adding this additional safeguard
to the closed military tribunal, one would still be able to select an impartial
271 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (calling the public's right of access to a
trial an "essential qualit[y] of a court of justice..." and holding that access will be denied
only under a strict scrutiny test.); id. at 9 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 567 (1980)).
272 See generally Levine v. United States., 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960) ("Unlike an ordi-
nary judicial inquiry, where publicity is the rule, grand jury proceedings are secret.");
Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939).
From earliest times it has been the policy of the law to shield the proceedings of [grand
juries] from public scrutiny, and to this end the grand jurors themselves have always
been sworn to keep their own counsel and that of the state or of the King. Courts and
text writers have advanced various reasons for this rule of privacy. In part the purpose
is to protect grand jurors, complainants and witnesses, so that the jurors may deliberate
and vote without fear that their conduct will be disclosed elsewhere, and that those who
testify may feel free to speak the truth without reserve. Other reasons for the rule are
that if the accused should learn that his conduct is under investigation he is likely to
flee arrest or to tamper with witnesses; and that one who is unjustly accused, but is ex-
onerated by the refusal of the grand jury to indict, may not suffer injustice by a disclo-
sure that he has been under investigation for the commission of a crime.
Id. at 519.
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panel of persons to oversee the proceedings, but not violate the security con-
cerns that the DOD Order addresses. Their presence would add impartial ob-
servers to the closed proceedings without endangering confidential informa-
tion. Laws that forbid the dissemination of classified information would bind
these people to secrecy;273 they could not disclose the closed portions of the
trial without exposing themselves to criminal prosecution.274 Moreover, a pre-
siding Officer, mindful of their presence, would be less likely to abuse the
power afforded to him under the liberal closure rules of the DOD Order.
Presently, there is no ability for an accused that stands trial before a tribunal
to appeal.275 Perhaps this one area needs refining. If a panel cannot, upon ob-
serving abuse of process by either the government or the Presiding Officer ad-
dress such abuse, it can provide no meaningful check at all. Without imposing
an entire appeals process on the proceeding, which the Military Order specifi-
cally rejects, the panel should instead be given the power to convene after each
closed session to decide if the conduct of the officers of the court during the
closed proceeding is proper. Should the panel find it was not, either through a
majority or unanimous vote, a representative of the panel could meet with the
Presiding Officer to address the concerns. Creating this panel and coupling it
with the closure rules already in place under the DOD Order ensures the pro-
tection of national security is protected while another meaningful check is
placed upon the tribunal.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a civilian criminal proceeding, the risks to national security are ordinarily
insignificant or non-existent, whereas in a military tribunal, classified informa-
tion often comprises much of the evidence presented by the prosecution. As a
result, it is easy to see why civilian criminal trials have enjoyed a historic tradi-
tion of openness,276 while judges in courts-martial have been more likely to
uphold a restricted right of access.277 A natural consequence of such historical
273 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2000).
274 Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § 3 et seq. (2000).
275 DOD Order, supra note 6, § 9.6(h)(6).
276 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982).
277 Court-martial cases use softer language in their opinions as opposed to the tighter
language used by judges in regular criminal proceedings and are more likely to recognize
the validity of closure than they are to justify a present First Amendment right of access
based on a historic one. Compare United States v. Scott, 48 M.J. 663, 665 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. 1998) ([Ain "overriding interest [can] justif[y] closure.") and ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47
M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F. 1997) ("[T]he right to a public hearing is not absolute.") and
United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116, 121 (C.M.A. 1977) ("[A]II spectators may be ex-
cluded to prohibit the release of classified information."), with Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) ("[A] presumption of openness inheres in ... our
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differences in access is that the closure of courts-martial is more acceptable to
the general public and also often seems more legitimate in their eyes.
While recognizing that the U. S. Constitution applies with full force to each
proceeding and that both proceedings carry a presumption of openness,"' the
structure of a court-martial deals more competently with the sensitive national
security concerns surrounding classified or confidential information in a mili-
tary prosecution. As such, the tests promulgated by military courts achieve the
correct balance between individual rights and national security. Since military
courts are often exposed to confidential information, tests delineated in the
opinions of military judges were undoubtedly designed with national security
considerations in mind. Unlike the tests designed by civilian judges that have
little or no experience with protecting classified national security information,
tests designed by military judges need not be strained to fit concerns they were
not designed to accommodate. Military tribunals more closely resemble a
court-martial rather than a regular criminal proceeding. Accordingly, First
Amendment access tests handed down by the military courts containing more
relaxed language regarding closure... provide a better fit for tribunals than the
strict scrutiny test of criminal courts.
Individual rights offer important protections and for regular criminal defen-
dants on trial during a peacetime scenario, they are constitutionally guaranteed.
Persons subject to military tribunals however, do not fall into that category and
these times are anything but peaceful. From the massive amount of harm and
devastation they can inflict, to their undying and often fanatical will to suc-
ceed, there is nothing regular or individual about a terrorist. They have de-
clared war against this country and operate using rogue tactics outside the
bounds of civility. They exist in highly organized and collective cells that are
capable of masterminding plans that can devastate thousands of lives. The
drive and will they maintain to carry out their plots is exceptional. Terrorists
often work in contingent teams. If one fails, another is ready and able to re-
place it. They exist only to destroy the very society that provides the constitu-
tional protection they seek.
The DOD Order and several military courts seek to strike the appropriate
balance between the rights of the accused to a public trial and the right of a
country to protect its citizens and valuable intelligence. With an eye always
towards safeguarding the citizens of this country, both individually and collec-
tively, the DOD Order mandates that terrorist trials carry a presumption of
system of justice.") and Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (calling the
public trail an "essential quality of the court of justice").
278 See Scott, 48 M.J. at 665.
279 See Grunden, 2 M.J. at 121-22; ABC, Inc., 47 M.J. at 363, and Press-Enterprise I,
478 U.S. at 9, nn.264, 273.
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openness, but recognizes that even though traditional First Amendment rules of
access "can be strained to accommodate the pressing need for secrecy, it does
not follow that they are best-suited for the task.
28 °
Since September I th, the world has changed. We exist today in a state of
war in perpetuity. Non-citizen terrorists are not garden-variety criminals and
therefore our treatment of them must also change. There is a way to balance
liberty and security so as to ensure the accused a public trial, while simultane-
ously protecting covert intelligence collection methods and materials from ex-
posure to the world. That way must be found, "[b]ut as we resist measures that
make us no better than those we seek to disarm and defeat, we must not bind
ourselves too tightly to a mast suited only for navigating peaceful seas."28'
280 See Tribe, supra note 140, at 20.
28J Id.
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